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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
part character plays in the success of a lawyer, the necessity of shaping
this character while a student by good moral training, and the conse-
quent effect of this basic need of lawyers.
Col. Hoynes, Dean Emeritus of the College of Law, has been in
St. Joseph Hospital in South Bend for several weeks.
The annual Lawyer's Ball will be held after the Easter holidays,
preparations for the ball having been begun already. The Law Club
is sponsoring the ball and again promises a successful climax to the
year's social activities of the club.
At the Washington Day exercises, thirty-five seniors, members of
this year's graduating class in the Law School took part, as the class
of 1933 presented a flag to the school.
Thomas E. Cougdan.
NOTE
MORTGAGES-DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE-RELATION BACK.-
Somewhat perplexing are the problems that arise when a person who
executes a mortgage to another, but does not deliver a deed, subse-
quently has the mortgage recorded without the knowledge of the mort-
gagee, and still later transfers the mortgaged res to a third person who
knows nothing further than the record. Is delivery necessary to render
the mortgage operative, and if so, does the act of the mortgagor in
recording, without the knowledge or assent of the mortgagee, constitute
sufficient delivery? Would a subsequent assent by the mortgagee to
the act of the mortgagor in recording relate back to the date of the
recording to cut off an intermediate transferee's interest?
A mortgage deed, like any other deed, to be valid and operative,
must be delivered by the mortgagor; without delivery it cannot take
effect as a transfer of title or as a security.' No particular form of
ceremony can be said to be necessary to constitute a sufficient delivery;
it may be by words without acts, or by acts without words, or by
both combined.2 Actual transfer of the deed from hand to hand
1 Mix v. Cowles, 20 Conn. 420 (1850). "The delivery of a deed is an essential
requisite to its validity, and it is from the delivery that the deed takes effect."
Goodsell v. Stinson, 7 Blackf. 437 (1845).
2 Rountree v. Smith, 152 Ill. 493 (1894).
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between the mortgagor and the mortgagee is not essential. All that
can be required is that there should be manifested a clear intention
of the parties that the instrument shall become operative as a mort-
gage, and that the mortgagor shall lose, and the mortgagee acquire,
the absolute control over it.
3
In many states, perhaps a majority, it is said that to constitute
a complete delivery so as to make it legally operative, acceptance on
the part of the mortgagee is necessary to its validity.4 In these
jurisdictions it is-held that the conveyance is not effective as against
the claims of a third person which accrued, by attachment, judgment,
or purchase for value, between the time of the purported delivery of
the instrument and the grantee's subsequent assent thereto.5 In other
states, an express acceptance is not essential to the validity of a
conveyance. And it has accordingly been held that when a mortgage
is beneficial to the mortgagee, his acceptance will be presumed in the
absence of contrary evidence, or it may be made out by implication
from circumstances, or from such conduct on his part as necessarily
supposes an acceptance of the mortgage by him.6 In regard to the
necessity of acceptance, it is not clear whether it is to be considered
an element of delivery or as something additional to, and separate
from delivery. The courts frequently suggest the former view. Tif-
fany,7 in discussing the subject, has this to say: "It is more satis-
factory, it is submitted, conceding that acceptance is necessary, to
regard it as something outside of delivery, as, in effect, an indication
of the grantee's intention, as delivery is an indication of the grantor's
intention."
Does the act of the mortgagor, in recording a mortgage without
the knowledge of the mortgagee, constitute a delivery? Such has
been frequently referred to as raising a presumption of delivery; a
statement that the grantor's action shows, prima facie, an intention on
his part that the instrument shall be legally operative. Thus, in
Rogers v. Head's Iron Foundry 8 it was said: "This Court has held
that, where a deed beneficial to the grantee is involuntarily executed
and placed on record by the grantor, the acceptance of the grantee
will be presumed. Issett v. Dewey, 47 Neb. 196. And on principle,
8 Merrills v. Swift, 18 Conn. 257 (1847).
4 "All agree that it is necessary to the validity of every deed or conveyance,
that therebe a grantee who is not only willing, but who does in fact accept it."
Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 (1860). Accord: Abernathie v. Rich, 99 N. E. -883
(Ill. 1912); Woodbury v. Fisher, 120 Ind. 387 (1863).
5 Parmelee v. Simpson, 18 L. Ed. 542 (1866); and cases cited infra note 6.
6 Ely v. Stannard, 44 Conn. 528 (1877); Baker v. Hall 73 N. E. 351 (IMI.
1905). See Tiffany on Real Property, Vol. II, § 463.
7 Op. cit. supra note 6.
8 61 Neb. 39, 70 N. W. 527, 37 L. R. A. 429 (1897). Accord: Elsberry v.
Boykin, 65 Ala. 336 (1880); Haskell v. Sevier, 25 Ark. 152 (1867).
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delivery of mortgage by the mortgagor or by his direction for record
is sufficient, in the absence of proof, to the contrary, to justify a find-
ing of its delivery by the mortgagor, and acceptance by the mortgagee.
But presumption of delivery and acceptance is not a conclusive one,
but is prima facie alone. It may be shown, if such be the fact, that
the mortgagee never accepted the instrument." In a few jurisdictions
this view is repudiated. Thus it was held in Stiles v. Probst 9 that
the mere execution of a mortgage and recording of it do not con-
stitute a delivery of the instrument to the mortgagee, where it is not
actually placed in his hands, or in the possession of someone author-
ized to receive it for him, and where the money loaned is not paid
over by the mortgagee; and that there can be no legal delivery of the
mortgage until the mortgagee is willing to accept it and does accept
it and pay over the consideration. In a number of cases it is said
that the grantor's action in recording the instrument does not show
delivery if this was without the knowledge or consent of the grantee.10
The presumption of delivery above referred to is recognized as being
subject to rebuttal by evidence that the mortgagor did not intend the
instrument to operate as a conveyance. 1
We have seen that delivery is essential to the validity of a mort-
gage; that, by the weight of authority, the act of the mortgagor in
recording the mortgage without the knowledge of the mortgagee, con-
stitutes prima facie evidence of a delivery; that express acceptance
by the mortgagee is necessary, but acceptance will be presumed in
the absence of evidence to the contrary where the mortgage is bene-
ficial to the mortgagee. Irrespective of the beneficial interest to the
mortgagee, would a subsequent acceptance by the mortgagee after the
mortgagor has transferred the mortgaged res relate back to the date
of recording by the mortgagor without the knowledge of the mortgagee
so as to cut off the transferee's interest? As between the mortgagor
and the mortgagee a mortgage not delivered, may take effect from the
date when it was left for record.' 2 But a delivery to the mortgagee
after the mortgage has been recorded does not relate back to the time
9 69 Ill. 382 (1873); Egan v. Horrigan, 96 Me. 46 (1901). Accord: Walton
v. Barton, 107 Ill. 54 (1883).
If the mortgage is made following an agreement of the parties to place a mort-
gage on specific property, which mortgagee has agreed to accept, then the act of
mortgagor in filing it for record constitutes a sufficient delivery of it (Bronson
v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455 (1894)) ; or if, after delivering it to the recorder, the mort-
gagor notifies mortgagee that it has been filed for record and latter approves or
acquiesces in the action taken (Parkhurst v. Berdell, S N. Y. S. 328 (1894),
Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Drury, 38 Vt. 426 (1866)); or, in general, if
mortgagee does any act showing his ratification of the manner of delivery (Kinney
v. Wells, op. cit. supra note 6).
10 Op. cit. supra note 5; Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 Ill. 199 (1894).
11 Humiston v. Preston, 34 At]. 544 (Conn. 1895).
12 Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 I1. 310 (1871).
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of recording to the prejudice of intervening equities of third persons.13
These equities might accrue by reason of attachment, the recovery of
a judgment, or a purchase of the property, between the date of the
recording and the grantee's subsequent assent thereto. In Goodsell v.
Stinson 14 a real estate mortgage was executed to one G, in the ab-
sence and without the knowledge of the latter, and was delivered by
the mortgagor to the recorder for record. Subsequently, .but before
the mortgagee was informed of what had been done, and before he
assented to the mortgagee, one S obtained a judgment against the
mortgagor. It was held that the judgment was entitled to the prefer-
ence. The court said: "The delivery of a deed is an essential requisite
to its validity, and it is from the delivery that the deed takes effect.
A deed may be delivered to a third person even a stranger, for the
benefit of the grantee, and if he afterwards assent to the act, the deed
will take effect from the date of its delivery, unless the rights of
third persons should be affected by it. In that event the doctrine of
relation would not apply, for it is a general rule, that it should not
be permitted to apply so as to do wrong to strangers; as between the
parties to the deed, it may be adopted for the advancement of jus-
tice." 15
13 "The mortgage of $60,000 was not delivered until the 7th of June, when
the money was advanced. Mr. Jacobus says that when it was handed to him,
he gave his check for the money. Up to that time it was no lien as against any
one. It had no validity. It had been executed and put on record, not only in
the absence of any agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee for the loan,
but without the knowledge of the latter. The considerations which would give
the mortgage relation back to its date as between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
are not applicable to the question between the present parties litigant." Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Co.. v. Rowand, 26 N. J. Eq. 389, 393 (1875).
Recording a mortgage before it is a completed conveyance gives it no superior
rights, so that if it has not been delivered to the mortgagee or accepted or assented
to by him, its record gives it no priority over a subsequent mortgage which is
executed, delivered, ahd recorded before the delivery or acceptance of the first.
Parmelee v. Simpson, 18 L. Ed. 542 (1866); Evans v. Coleman, 28 S. E. 645 (Ga.
1897); Lanphier v. Desmond, 58 N. .E. 343 (I1. 1900).
14 7 Blackf. 437 (1845).
15 Accord: Woodbury v. Fisher, 20 Ind. 387 (1863); Johnson v. Farley, 45
N. H. 505; Hlibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547 (1885); Day v. Griffith, 15 Ia. 104
(1863).
In Bell v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, 11 Bush. 34, 21 Am. Rep. 205 (1874),
it was said: "A deed delivered to the registering officer or to an unauthorized
third person, and subsequently accepted by the grantee, will take effect as between
the grantor and the grantee from the time of the first delivery; and in such the
grantor and ordinary creditors who have acquired no lien upon nor interest in the
estate conveyed are entitled to no greater consideration than the grantor. Yet,
until the grantee is informed of the execution of the deed and does some act
equivalent to an acceptance of it, it is manifest that he may refuse to accept it,
notwithstanding the fact that by a fiction of law the presumption of an actual
acceptance had all the while existed for his benefit as against the grantor, his
heirs, devisees, and ordinary creditors. But this fiction will not be allowed to
